Resonating, rejecting, reinterpreting: Mapping the stabilization discourse in the United Nations Security Council, 2000–14 by Curran, D. & Holtom, P.
  
Resonating, rejecting, reinterpreting: 
Mapping the stabilization discourse in 
the United Nations Security Council, 
2000–14 
 
Curran, D. and Holtom, P 
 
Published PDF deposited in Curve December 2015 
 
Original citation:  
Curran, D. and Holtom, P. (2015) Resonating, rejecting, reinterpreting: Mapping the 
stabilization discourse in the United Nations Security Council, 2000–14. Stability, volume 4 
(1): Article number 50. DOI: 10.5334/sta.gm 
 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gm 
 
Ubiquity Press 
 
Creative Commons Attribution License 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively 
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The 
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
 
CURVE is the Institutional Repository for Coventry University 
 
http://curve.coventry.ac.uk/open  
Curran, D and Holtom, P 2015 Resonating, Rejecting, Reinterpreting: 
Mapping the Stabilization Discourse in the United Nations Security 
Council, 2000–14. Stability: International Journal of Security & 
Development, 4(1): 50, pp. 1–18, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gm
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Resonating, Rejecting, Reinterpreting: 
Mapping the Stabilization Discourse in the 
United Nations Security Council, 2000–14
Dr. David Curran* and Dr. Paul Holtom†
This article charts the evolution of the conceptualisation of stabilization in the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) during the period 2001–2014. UNSC open meetings 
provide an important dataset for a critical review of stabilization discourse and 
an opportunity to chart the positions of permanent Members, rotating Members 
and the UN Secretariat towards this concept. This article is the first to conduct 
an analysis of this material to map the evolution of stabilization in this critical 
chamber of the UN. This dataset of official statements will be complemented by 
a review of open source reporting on UNSC meetings and national stabilization 
doctrines of the ‘P3’ – France, the UK and the US. These countries have developed 
national stabilization doctrines predominantly to deal with cross-governmental 
approaches to counterinsurgency operations conducted during the 2000s. The 
article therefore presents a genealogy of the concept of stabilization in the 
UNSC to help understand implications for its future development in this multi-
lateral setting.
This article begins by examining efforts by the P3 to ‘upload’ their conceptu-
alisations of stabilization into UN intervention frameworks. Secondly, the article 
uses a content analysis of UNSC debates during 2000–2014 to explore the extent 
to which the conceptualisation of stabilization resonated with other Council mem-
bers, were rejected in specific contexts or in general, or were re-interpreted by 
member states to suit alternative security agendas and interests. Therefore, the 
article not only examines the UNSC debates surrounding existing UN ‘stabilization 
operations’ (MONUSCO, MINUSTAH, MINUSCA, MINUSMA), which could be regarded 
as evidence that this ‘western’ concept has resonated with other UNSC members 
and relevant UN agencies, but also documents the appearance of stabilization in 
other contexts too. The article opens new avenues of research into concepts of 
stabilization within the UN, and seeks to provide a thorough accounting of the 
origins, spread, and potential trajectories for the concept and practice of stabili-
zation in UN contexts.
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Introduction
The 2015 Report of the High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations 
examined a vast array of issues connected with 
peacekeeping operations. The Panel noted 
the strong link between peacekeeping and 
stabilization within the UN debates, stress-
ing that the term has a ‘wide range of inter-
pretations’, and that the ‘usage of this term 
by the United Nations requires clarification’ 
(UN 2015: 30). This article represents the first 
attempt to respond to this request. It seeks 
to identify the level to which stabilization has 
permeated United Nations (UN) activities, 
through the examination of data from open 
meetings of the UN Security Council (UNSC). 
This article addresses two objectives. Firstly, 
it provides an account of the use of stabiliza-
tion in open UNSC meetings at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century (2000–2014); and 
secondly, it determines the extent to which 
western conceptualization(s) of stabilization 
resonate with UN member states from other 
regional groups, or if they reinterpret or 
reject such conceptualization(s).
We chose to analyse the UNSC as it pro-
vides an anchor point where concepts of 
peace and security are operationalized 
through the mandating of UN operations. 
It is also an arena where ‘divergent views 
and interest confront each other and seek 
accommodation’ (Teixeria 2003). The study 
includes records of UNSC meetings where 
all members have the opportunity to out-
line their approach to pressing issues, as 
well as records from open meetings where 
the wider UN membership are invited to 
present their opinions on pressing matters. 
Moreover, the UNSC has been identified as 
a useful arena for ‘extending one’s influence 
across the range of UN activities’, where it 
is the ‘powerful states’ in the council who 
‘will be more easily able to enhance that 
power through the machinery of the United 
Nations’ (Cunliffe 2013: 236). This has logi-
cally created inquiry about the extent to 
which the five permanent members of the 
Council (P5) – but in particular the so-called 
P3 of France, the United Kingdom (UK) and 
the United States of America (US) – expand 
their security concerns, at the cost of the UN 
itself (Durch 2010: 45).
Reflections on stabilization in the UNSC 
address important policy and academic 
concerns. This is important at a time when 
the UN’s wider peace and security archi-
tecture is under review (UN News Centre 
2015). Moreover, with the goal of increas-
ing European contributors to UN operations 
(Karlsrud and Smith 2015), those member 
states with greater experience of counter-
insurgency and stabilization operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan may become key con-
tributors to UN field missions. That the US is 
leading this push is also important, as the US 
has been at the centre of both the Iraq and 
Afghanistan campaigns (Power 2014; 2015). 
On an academic level, this article offers an 
exploratory approach to understanding the 
diffusion of norms in the UN, as well as seek-
ing to understand national approaches. It 
does not claim to offer solid ‘answers’ to the 
acceptance of western conceptualizations of 
stabilization in the UN. Rather, it raises ques-
tions about the use and interpretation of lan-
guage in the UNSC, especially when the term 
in use – stabilization – is in itself critiqued 
for being a vague concept.
The article consists of four sections. The 
first section offers an overview of stabiliza-
tion, and how, even without a formal policy 
shift, concepts of stabilization have impacted 
UN peacekeeping operations. This also pro-
vides the rationale for focusing attention on 
the UNSC. Second, it offers a brief introduc-
tion to the method of data collection. Third, 
the article provides an overview of the fre-
quency of the use of stabilization in UNSC 
meetings during 2000–2014, charting the 
number of meetings in which stabilization 
featured and how often it was used. The final 
section looks in greater depth at the use of 
stabilization in the UNSC, and seeks to deter-
mine whether the conceptualization reso-
nated or was reinterpreted, or rejected by UN 
member states.
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Conceptualizing Stabilization
It is difficult to provide a single conception 
of the term ‘stabilization’ in the context of 
international interventions. Rob Muggah has 
noted that the term ‘means different things 
to different people’ (Muggah 2014: 3). Roger 
McGinty has more forcefully criticized the 
adoption of the term ‘stabilization’ as being 
a ‘hodge podge’ of words ‘carelessly’ merg-
ing with other ‘terms that have distinct defi-
nitions’ in existing areas of peacebuilding, 
security and development (McGinty 2012: 
24). Nevertheless, as this section demon-
strates, a shared understanding of the con-
cept of ‘stabilization’ has emerged amongst 
a range of NATO member states, as well as 
Australia and New Zealand (which we define 
as Western States, with most of these States 
included in the UN regional group ‘Western 
Europe and Other Group’).
These states can be identified in reports 
which seek to explore the concept of stabi-
lization more broadly. For instance, a report 
by the Global Public Policy Institute identi-
fied and mapped eleven countries which 
possess a ‘conceptual understanding of 
politically driven and primarily civilian stabi-
lization efforts, the scope of their stabiliza-
tion activities and the level of organizational 
integration in budgeting, decision-making 
and policy development’ (Rotmann and 
Steinacker 2013: 7). The states identified in 
this group were Canada, Denmark, France, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, 
and the US. Moreover, a 2014 report by the 
Hague Institute of Security Studies iden-
tifies the following countries with noted 
approaches to stabilization: Canada; France; 
Germany; the Netherlands; New Zealand; 
United Kingdom; United States of America 
(as well as NATO) (De Spiegeleire et al 2014: 
8). Academic studies of the stabilization phe-
nomenon also highlight the role played by 
one or more of these states in developing 
‘government departments committed exclu-
sively to its advancement’ (Muggah 2014: 6).
The central theme in these national 
approaches to stabilization is that such 
interventions are designed to bring support 
to the ability of a ‘failed or failing state’ to 
deliver key services. This support is expected 
to fulfil basic services and maintain security 
when the national authorities do not pos-
sess sufficient authority and resources to 
exercise control within their borders. For 
the past ten years (particularly since the 
events of 9/11), these states have been cast 
as ‘sources of instability’ in particular havens 
for terrorist organisations (Mazarr 2014). For 
instance, the Canadian approach to stabiliza-
tion defines the ‘unique challenges’ posed by 
failed states as follows:
Confronting the unique challenges 
associated with fragile and conflict- 
affected states is in line with global 
and national security concerns, 
including terrorism and organized 
crime, as well foreign policy priorities 
related to promoting free and open 
societies; strengthening democracies 
and encouraging economic oppor-
tunity; and security for Canadians 
(FATDC n.d.).
Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq – pre-
dominantly from NATO member states – were 
followed by efforts to establish new national 
institutional architectures to ‘stabilize’ the 
situation in these states (De Coning and Friis 
2011: 250). This has led to an understand-
ing of stabilization as an idea with its roots 
firmly planted in western states. Muggah has 
argued that this has led to western conceptu-
alizations of stabilization being ‘uncritically 
adopted’ by policymakers and institutions 
(Muggah 2014: 3). Simone Haysom and 
Ashley Jackson have gone so far as to argue 
that the level of support for stabilization has 
been ‘fanatical’ (Haysom and Jackson 2013: 
38; Jackson and Haysom 2013: 9).
The western ‘comprehensive approach’ 
to stabilization is based on civilian-led pro-
cesses, supported by military actors. The UK – 
for some time considered the ‘international 
role models of an inter-agency approach’ 
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(Rotmann and Steinacker 2013: 15) – aligns 
itself ‘behind a model that focuses on sup-
port for state legitimacy, responsiveness, 
resilience and competence in service deliv-
ery’ (Gordon 2010: 383). This, in the view 
of Stuart Gordon, is based on the following 
pillars: focussing on the state’s ‘survival func-
tions’, in particular leadership, structures 
and institutions; building ‘social capital’ 
through reinforcing sub-national govern-
ance structures to connect with the popula-
tion (including a vibrant civil society); and 
delivery of essential services and ‘some iconic 
reconstruction projects’ (Gordon, 2010: 370). 
The UK’s approach has been spearheaded by 
the ‘Stabilization Unit’, established in 2007 
to replace the ‘Post Conflict Reconstruction 
Unit’. The Stabilization Unit is funded by 
the UK Government’s Conflict Stability and 
Security Fund, which is directly governed 
through the National Security Council 
(Stabilization Unit n.d.). It develops policy 
‘to protect and promote legitimate political 
authority, using a combination of integrated 
civilian and military actions to reduce vio-
lence, re-establish security and prepare for 
longer-term recovery by building an ena-
bling environment for structural stability’ 
(Stabilization Unit 2014: 1). The unit allows 
the UK to ‘rapidly provide integrated teams 
with military and civilian experts for fragile 
states’ (Rotmann and Steinacker 2013: 12).
A narrower western stabilization approach 
consists of one led by the military, rather 
than civilians. It is characterized as ‘hot sta-
bilization’, and defines the role of outsiders 
as enforcing ‘aspects of a settlement through 
the defeat of an insurgency while simultane-
ously cementing support for a domestically 
owned process of “transition” towards peace 
as well as building societal capacities to resist 
conflict drivers’ (Gordon 2010: 372). The ‘hot’ 
approach has been identified in Afghanistan 
where there has been a prioritization of coun-
terinsurgency activities aligned with creating 
support for the host nation government. This 
has seen an ‘overlap of military force and 
what have traditionally been aspects of civil-
ian-led reconstruction’ (Barakat and Larson 
2014: 32–3). Doctrinally, the ‘hot’ approach 
can best be identified in the United States’ 
Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations of 
September 2011 (Joint Chiefs of Staff (USA) 
2011). The US military identifies its role in 
stabilization operations as follows:
The establishment of security funda-
mentally requires a monopoly on the 
use of force by a single entity. In stabi-
lization efforts, the goal is normally to 
support a legitimate HN [Host Nation] 
governmental authority that holds 
this monopoly, using it to protect the 
population, or to help that author-
ity attain the monopoly. Toward this 
goal, joint forces take action to sup-
port efforts to end ongoing conflict, 
build HN security force capacity, and 
disarm adversary forces (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (USA) 2011: xvi).
Therefore, although the concept of ‘stabili-
zation’ can be quite messy, it is possible to 
discern key elements of western conceptu-
alisations in this approach: a combination of 
civilian and military approaches with a focus 
on re-establishing state authority in ‘failed 
states’; this includes provision of ‘legiti-
mate’ state authority, institution-building, 
and delivery of key state services. It is sup-
ported by the use of military force, bordering 
on counterinsurgency, and predominantly 
aimed against non-state actors who chal-
lenge the state’s monopoly on violence.
From UN Peacekeeping Operations to 
UN Stabilization Missions
For followers of UN peacekeeping and peace-
building operations, there is a sense that 
the approaches outlined above increasingly 
influence the mandates and activities of 
UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding opera-
tions. This may not be a ‘headline’ change, 
but something more diffuse. It could be 
argued that UN peacekeeping, peacebuild-
ing, and political missions have been under-
taking tasks akin to stabilization for some 
time. The UN Transitional Administrations 
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in East Timor and Kosovo have incorporated 
elements of the stabilization agenda, with 
a focus on military, legal, democratic, eco-
nomic and social capacity-building. They 
have also been linked in part to operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (Bellamy and Williams 
2010: 266). Moreover, those taking a criti-
cal perspective towards concepts of stabi-
lization, argue that the ‘success’ of UN-led 
multilateral peacekeeping operations in the 
1990s, ‘in some ways laid the conceptual and 
institutional groundwork for the next gener-
ation of stabilization that emerged following 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001’ 
(Barakat, Deely and Zyck 2010: 308).
Now it appears that the diffusion is return-
ing to UN operations. Most notably, there has 
been a steady rise in UN ‘stabilization mis-
sions’ – i.e. missions that have ‘stabilization’ 
in their title:
• MINUSTAH: Mission des Nations Unies 
pour la stabilization en Haïti (2004–)
• MONUSCO: Mission de l’Organisation 
des Nations unies pour la stabilization 
en République démocratique du Congo 
(2010–)
• MINUSMA: The United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (2013–)
• MINUSCA: United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in the Central 
African Republic (2014–)
These missions have been linked to the 
broader re-envisioning of UN peacekeeping 
operations and how they have developed 
methods to reflect the ‘growing recognition 
of intrastate conflicts as a new frontier for 
intervention’ (Carter 2013: 3). They have 
also been linked to wider, more formal, 
strategies such as the protection of civilians. 
In 2013, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon 
stated that:
The establishment of the new mandate 
for the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
and the strengthening of the mandate 
of the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo have offered 
opportunities to enhance our ability to 
protect civilians. At the same time, the 
evolving nature of our protection role 
also poses significant challenges for the 
Council to consider. In particular, we 
must beware of the risk of being seen as 
a party to conflict and diminishing our 
ability to provide impartial and timely 
humanitarian assistance’ (UN 2013h: 4).
However, the emergence of these stabili-
zation missions, and their linkages with 
concepts of stabilization, have brought chal-
lenges for the missions themselves, as well as 
for the broader conceptualisation of peace-
keeping in the United Nations.
Activities undertaken by the MONUSCO 
operation have introduced a range of ques-
tions regarding the development of stabili-
zation strategies in the mission’s make-up. 
The authorization of the ‘Force Intervention 
Brigade’ (FIB) in March 2013 arguably took 
UN peacekeeping to unchartered territory 
regarding the use of robust force by a peace-
keeping operation. The FIB, as outlined by 
UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013), is comprised 
of three infantry battalions: artillery, special 
force and reconnaissance. It is mandated to 
carry out ‘targeted operations to “neutral-
ize and disarm” the notorious 23 March 
Movement (M23), and other Congolese reb-
els and foreign armed groups’ in the east of 
the country (UN 2013c), as part of a wider 
drive by MONUSCO to ‘proactively protect 
civilians’. The actions of MONUSCO and the 
FIB have largely supported the International 
Security and Stabilization Support Strategy, 
which aims in particular to support ‘the estab-
lishment of sustainable security forces and 
the consolidation of state authority in east-
ern Congo’ (United Nations MONUSCO n.d.). 
Part of the operationalization of this strategy 
has been to use the FIB to build ‘islands of 
stability’ throughout the east of the country 
where the operation has undertaken a ‘shape, 
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clear, and hold’ strategy, linked to similar 
approaches seen in ‘hot stabilization con-
texts’ in Afghanistan and Iraq (Cooper 2014). 
In this case, the operation seeks to gain a 
tactical military victory – shape and clear – 
before maintaining a secure environment 
and linking the population to the host gov-
ernment (Cordesman 2009). The idea behind 
this is to avoid an ‘immediate relapse of the 
communities concerned into a cycle of vio-
lence after armed groups have freed an area’ 
(Vogel 2014: 5). However, the approach has 
led to concern that only certain, strategically 
important areas will be considered relevant, 
while those areas not deemed a priority will 
receive little support (Vogel 2014: 5). Signs of 
this concern have been identified in a bilat-
eral context where, in an attempt to consoli-
date the peace process, the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) moved 
its health provision efforts from more stable 
areas with ‘little or no healthcare’ towards 
more unstable areas (Gordon 2010).
In the case of MINUSTAH, the push for sta-
bilization has brought difficulties of a more 
strategic nature. Nicolas Lemay-Herbert 
argues that the discourse identifying Haiti 
as a ‘failed state’, requiring stabilization has 
‘legitimized all forms of international inter-
vention’, providing something of an ‘open 
season’ on the country (Lemay-Hébert 2014: 
199). This focus on the need for interna-
tional actors to provide stabilization in Haiti 
has taken the focus away from the negative 
impact that international factors have played 
on Haiti’s instability. This effectively perpetu-
ates structural violence in the country, and 
decreases the chance of introducing a ‘com-
prehensive perspective’ that aims to bring 
positive change to the country (Lemay-Hébert 
2014: 199). Likewise, in the case of Mali 
(MINUSMA), Isaline Bergamaschi mirrors the 
concerns of Lemay Herbert by asking to what 
extent international efforts to ‘build a state’ 
have actually fed into the instability that Mali 
has suffered (Bergamaschi 2013: 10).
Significantly for this article, the 2015 
Report of the High-Level Independent Panel 
on Peace Operations noted that ‘the Security 
Council and the Secretariat have used the 
term “stabilization” for a number of missions 
that support the extension or restoration 
of state authority and, in at least one case, 
during ongoing armed conflict’ (UN 2015: 
30). Therefore, the High-Level Panel recog-
nized that UN stabilization missions bear 
the hallmarks of the western comprehensive 
approach outlined above.
The concept of stabilization has also had 
a noted effect on the UN’s regional partners 
in peacekeeping operations and stabilization 
missions. Yvonne Akpasom and Walter Lotze’s 
survey of African Union (AU) operations 
has noted that AU operations in Somalia, 
Mali, and the Central African Republic have 
sought ‘to support the stabilization of coun-
tries as they transition from war to peace’ 
(Akpasom and Lotze 2014: 19–20). This has 
led to wider reflection on the AU’s peace 
and security architecture (Gomes Porto and 
Engel 2010), in particular the establishment 
of the African Standby Force (ASF), a struc-
ture based on five rapidly deployable military 
brigades which are equipped to deploy into 
post-conflict environments at short notice. 
Akpasom and Lotze note that as the ASF was 
developed in 2006, significant attention was 
paid to ‘prevention, peacekeeping opera-
tions, peace enforcement, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding’. In contrast, the ‘concept of 
stabilization operations and tasks did not 
feature explicitly or prominently’, signifying 
that there was little guidance on stabiliza-
tion operations. This, in the view of Akpasom 
and Lotze, is contrary to the interventions 
that AU forces are currently undertaking in 
increasingly complex environments ‘involv-
ing the need to take on open and direct 
resistance from belligerent groups, whilst 
at the same time supporting tasks related to 
governance and nation-building’ (Akpasom 
and Lotze 2014: 19–20).
Therefore, it can be argued that approaches 
similar to stabilization have introduced chal-
lenges to particular UN missions. However, 
the guiding principles of UN peacekeeping 
make little mention of the concept. The UN’s 
Principles and Guidelines make little reference 
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to this principle, and as mentioned above, 
there is no UN-wide stabilization strategy (De 
Coning 2014: 31–2). Muggah has argued that 
‘a thorough accounting of the origins, spread, 
and implications of stabilization in United 
Nations circles has yet to be written’ (Muggah 
2014). This article represents a tentative first 
step in this direction, by mapping the stabiliza-
tion discourse in the UNSC over a critical fif-
teen-year period in an attempt to understand 
how the concept has developed within the UN.
Method
In order to achieve the two key objectives of 
this article – (a) charting the use of stabilization 
in the UNSC and (b) determining the resonance 
of the western conceptualizations of stabiliza-
tion with other UN member states – one of the 
first key steps in the research for this article 
was to construct a dataset that captured every 
instance when ‘stabilization’1 was mentioned 
in open UNSC meetings between 2000–2014. 
At a minimum, the dataset needed to provide 
the following elements for each entry:
• the meeting in which stabilization was 
used; 
• the speaker and the UN member state, 
UN agency or regional organization that 
they represented; and
• the context in which stabilization was 
used. 
The final element was to determine whether 
the speaker’s use of stabilization could be 
classified as:
• resonating with the western conceptual-
izations presented above;
• a reinterpretation of stabilization; or
• a rejection of the western conceptual-
ization of stabilization.
To construct this dataset, we collated all of 
the transcripts of open UNSC meetings that 
took place between 2000 and 2014. During 
this period the UNSC held 3,087 meetings, of 
which 2,757 were ‘open meetings’. Transcripts 
of the open meetings, and communiques for 
the closed meetings, are published on the 
‘Meetings records’ page of the UNSC website 
(UN n.d.). The communiques and transcripts 
for these meetings yielded a dataset of 3,332 
documents; the large number was due to the 
fact that meetings are sometimes split into 
separate sessions, with a transcript for each 
session. PDF copies of the open UNSC meeting 
records were uploaded to QDA data miner, and 
then the Wordstat package was used to extract 
all instances in which ‘stabilization’ or ‘stabiliza-
tion’ featured in a UNSC meeting. This yielded 
4,464 instances in which the word ‘stabiliza-
tion’ was used, and noted the paragraph in the 
meeting transcript for each instance. We could 
therefore identify the meeting record, speaker 
and UN member state, and the UN agency or 
regional organization that they represented for 
each entry in our dataset. However, this pro-
cess also presented entries that do not relate 
to the concept of stabilization discussed above. 
Therefore, as a first step to aid in our analysis, 
we removed all entries in which stabilization 
appeared in the following ways:
• When the speaker announced that they 
were speaking on behalf of the EU and 
‘the countries of the stabilization and 
association process’;
• When the speaker referred to the stabili-
zation and association process or agree-
ment in South-Eastern Europe; or
• When the UNSC meeting document 
referred to a UN Stabilization Mission in 
the title of the meeting or transcript.
As a result of this process, we identified 724 
open UNSC meetings and a total of 3,666 
times during 2000–2014 in which a speaker 
uttered the word ‘stabilization’. This repre-
sents the dataset that we used for analysis. 
As will be shown below, the data provided a 
solid basis on which to carry out a quantita-
tive analysis of the frequency of the use of 
stabilization in UNSC meetings. However, it 
presented challenges for a qualitative analy-
sis and categorization of speakers and their 
states, and agencies’ or organizations’ atti-
tudes towards stabilization.
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Data on the frequency of the use of 
stabilization
Table 1 presents the annual frequency of 
the use of the word ‘stabilization’ in the open 
UNSC meetings held during 2000–2014. 
The number of meetings in which ‘stabiliza-
tion’ is mentioned each year – expressed as 
either a total number of meetings in which 
stabilization is used or as a percentage of 
total open meetings – fluctuated between 
2000 and 2009. For example, stabilization is 
mentioned in 26 meetings in 2000 (16 per 
cent of total open meetings), but decreased 
to 19 meetings in 2001 (10 per cent of open 
meetings). It subsequently increased to 
46 meetings in 2002 (26 per cent of open 
meetings) and then decreased again to 
43 meetings in 2003 (23 per cent of open 
meetings). Since 2009, the total number of 
meetings in which stabilization features has 
increased year-on-year from 52 meetings in 
2009 (30 per cent of total open meetings) to 
102 meetings in 2014 (44 per cent of total 
open meetings). The data shows that stabi-
lization is used in a greater number of open 
UNSC meetings today than at the turn of the 
millennium.
The annual trend in the number of times 
that stabilization is utilised in open UNSC 
meetings fluctuated significantly between 
2001 and 2007. The main ‘outlier’ for these 
years is 2004, when ‘stabilization’ featured 
247 times in 43 open UNSC meetings. 
A key factor for the relatively high num-
ber of instances of stabilization in 2004 is 
because of a special session of the UNSC 
on Cooperation between the United Nations 
and regional organizations in stabilization 
processes. This session was organized when 
Romania served as the chair of the Security 
Council, in which the term was used 84 
times (UN 2004c). Since 2007, there has been 
a year-on-year increase in the total number 
of times that stabilization is uttered in an 
open UNSC meeting, rising from 146 times 
in 2007 to 671 times in 2014. The last year 
in this sample reported a significant increase 
over the 443 times that stabilization was 
used in 2013.
As Table 2 shows, the usage of stabilization 
features most prominently in meetings on:
• The situation in a state that hosts a UN 
or NATO-led peacekeeping operation; 
• UN peacekeeping; 
• Post-conflict peacebuilding; or 
• Cooperation with regional and sub-
regional organizations.
During 2001–2014, the ten topics listed in 
Table 2 accounted for 51 per cent of the 
open UNSC meetings in which stabilization 
was used. The use of stabilization in these 
367 meetings accounted for 75 per cent of 
the times that stabilization was used in an 
open UNSC meeting. The dataset records 39 
meetings on Haiti in which stabilization was 
mentioned 834 times – in most cases in refer-
ence to the title of MINUSTAH. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that the state in which the UN’s 
longest serving stabilization mission oper-
ates should represent the topic in which we 
find the most instances of stabilization being 
used. However, stabilization is used in the 
Haiti meetings 500 times more than in the 
topic recording the second highest frequency 
of stabilization use: peacekeeping operations. 
While it is not remarkable that meetings 
on peacekeeping operations represent the 
second-most frequent occasions in which 
stabilization is used, it is still striking on two 
counts. First, that despite ranking second, 
there were only 17 meetings on peacekeep-
ing operations during 2000–2014 in which 
stabilization was used, and mainly from 2009 
onwards. Second, exactly half of the instances 
of the use of stabilization occurred in three 
meetings in 2014. This is in large part due 
to the maturing of stabilization missions in 
Haiti and DRC, and the introduction of sta-
bilization missions in Mali in 2013 and the 
Central African Republic (CAR) in 2014. These 
last two missions are not included in Table 2 
below, but also contributed to the increased 
frequency of the use of stabilization in the 
UNSC in 2013 and 2014. For example, sta-
bilization featured 45 times in the 12 meet-
ings on the Central African Republic held 
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during 2013–2014, and 64 times during the 
13 meetings on Mali during the same period. 
While there is a clear correlation between the 
frequency of the use of stabilization in open 
UNSC meetings regarding the situation in 
states, and the period during which the state 
in question hosts a UN stabilization mission, 
it is worth noting that stabilization was dis-
cussed in meetings on the Central African 
Republic in 2001, and 2008–2014. One 
therefore expects that the number of times in 
which stabilization is used in meetings con-
sidering the situation in CAR and Mali will be 
comparatively high in the coming years. 
In contrast, one can clearly see the 
decline in the usage of stabilization to refer 
to meetings on the situation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina hosted a NATO-led stabiliza-
tion mission during 1999–2006 and Kosovo 
from 1999 until the present day, albeit in 
a significantly reduced capacity. Although 
not reflected in Table 2, the International 
Stabilisation Force in Timor Leste and its pre-
decessor, the International Force East Timor 
(INTERFET), were discussed in 27 meetings 
on the situation in Timor during 2000–2014, 
with stabilization being used 100 times.
Stabilization is also used in a wide range 
of other UN meetings on topics such as 
Children and Armed Conflict, Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security, Protection 
of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Threats to 
International Peace and Security, and Women 
and Peace and Security. However, in most of 
these cases the use of stabilization is in con-
nection with a stabilization mission and its 
contribution to addressing the challenges 
discussed in the thematic debate. On the 
occasions that stabilization features in meet-
ings on the situation in the Middle East, it 
is used to discuss ‘stabilization and economic 
reform’, stabilization of conflicts and the sta-
bilization of post-conflict environments.
Resonate, Reinterpret or Reject?
As noted above, there is not a clearly iden-
tifiable western conceptualisation of stabi-
lization. This represents the first challenge 
for determining whether a western concep-
tualisation of stabilization resonates with 
UN member states, or is reinterpreted or 
rejected. Therefore, the analysis focuses on 
attitudes towards peacekeeping operations 
led by the UN, NATO, the AU or ECOWAS that 
have elements of western conceptualizations 
of stabilization in their mandate. Therefore, 
the analysis considers states in which sta-
bilization appears to resonate or is reinter-
preted altogether. The analysis did not reveal 
very strong rejections of stabilization mis-
sions, but there are several clear examples of 
scepticism.
A second challenge stems from the fact 
that this research only utilizes statements 
made in the performative space of the UNSC. 
In several cases, this source alone does not 
enable one to definitively conclude if a state 
accepts all or only elements of the western 
conceptualization of stabilization, or rejects 
stabilization missions. Therefore, the find-
ings presented below are tentative and 
should be regarded as providing hypotheses 
for further investigation rather than a defini-
tive categorization.
A third challenge is posed by the fact that 
several groups of states are supportive of 
stabilization missions in their own region 
but express scepticism about their adop-
tion in other regions. The clearest example 
of this is provided by states located in Latin 
America that support and provide person-
nel for MINUSTAH but express concern with 
regards to MONUSCO. For example, in a June 
2014 meeting on PKO, the representatives 
of Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay 
expressed their concerns regarding the 
robust mandate of MONUSCO (UN 2014a: 
6, 23, 35 and 43; see also UN 2013f: 21). As 
will be shown below, this research notes a 
division between states in Latin America and 
sub-Saharan Africa on the use of force in sta-
bilization missions.
Resonate and reinterpret
It is possible to clearly identify four groups of 
UN member states that support stabilization 
missions and for which it is possible to argue 
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that western conceptualizations resonate 
to some degree. These states are located in 
regions in which stabilization missions have 
been established.
Unsurprisingly, given that UN peacekeep-
ing operations and stabilization missions 
require the consent of the host state to 
deploy, the first group of states that posi-
tively view stabilization mandates consists 
of those states and entities that host multi-
lateral peacekeeping operations with stabili-
zation elements in their mandates, namely: 
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Central African Republic, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Haiti, Mali, Somalia, 
South Sudan and Timor-Leste. For example, 
in a March 2004 open UNSC meeting on the 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its rep-
resentative stated, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is a positive example of how intervention by 
the international community can be effec-
tive and of how a post-conflict country can 
become an active participant in the process 
of regional stabilization’ (UN 2004a: 10). 
Representatives of the other states listed 
above also credit the role played by the sta-
bilization mission located in their state as 
positively contributing towards stabilization. 
Representatives of Mali and Somalia explic-
itly requested the UNSC to deploy stabiliza-
tion missions to address security challenges 
in their respective states (UN 2004e: 7; UN 
2013d: 6–7). Of course, the actual mandates 
of the peacekeeping operations and stabiliza-
tion missions listed above differ considerably. 
However, of particular interest in this regard 
is the request by the representative of Libya 
for the UN to support ‘stabilization and insti-
tution- building initiatives’ in Libya, but not 
‘a military intervention’ (UN 2014b: 7).
The second group consists of Western 
European and other Group (WEOG) and 
Eastern European Group states that are 
members of the EU and/or NATO. These 
states have led or actively participated in 
stabilization missions in Europe and Asia 
since the 1990s. Two tendencies can be 
identified in their interventions in open 
UNSC meetings. First, Eastern European 
Group States that are members of the EU 
and NATO have been particularly support-
ive of western conceptualizations of sta-
bilization. The clearest example of this is 
demonstrated by the decision of Romania 
to declare that it made ‘the relationship 
between global and regional organizations 
in stabilization processes a main thread of 
its mandate as an elected member of the 
Security Council’ (UN 2004b: 7). Second, EU 
and NATO member states regard their expe-
rience of stabilization missions in Europe 
and Asia as very positive examples for 
addressing challenging security situations 
in fragile and conflict-affected states and 
territories. For example, the representative 
of the Netherlands declared in 2007 that 
the ISAF mission is ‘a state-of-the-art stabi-
lization mission’ that yielded
valuable experience (. . .) that can be 
put to use in other fragile or failed 
States. ISAF is an Assistance Force, 
providing security and stability so that 
the legitimate Afghan Government, in 
cooperation with international organi-
zations and other civilian development 
actors, can succeed (UN 2007: 27).
The third group consists of states in the Latin 
America and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) that 
have contributed personnel to MINUSTAH, in 
particular, the Friends of Haiti. These states 
seek to stabilize the situation in Haiti via a 
long-term commitment from the interna-
tional community towards a comprehensive 
approach. In Chile, for example:
The United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been 
designed to rehabilitate a nation in 
political, economic and social terms, 
in order to achieve lasting peace 
and security. The operation’s multi-
dimensional mandate encompasses 
the essential elements of a strategy 
for managing the civilian aspects of 
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the crisis. It is a matter of priority to 
restore the capacities of the Haitian 
national police and the rule of law 
(UN 2004d: 9).
The fourth group consists of states in the 
Africa Group located in sub-Saharan Africa. 
An analysis of statements by these states 
and representatives of the AU in open UNSC 
meetings reveals support for a broad inter-
pretation of stabilization as it applies not 
only to post-conflict periods but also to 
conflict-ridden periods. While sub-Saharan 
African states welcome the comprehen-
sive nature of stabilization operations and 
push for ‘multidimensional peacekeeping 
operations’, these states are more open than 
GRULAC states to including the use of force 
in stabilization missions. For example, sev-
eral African states have spoken in support of 
the deployment of the FIB under MONUSCO 
and its robust mandate, as well as the robust 
mandates of MINUSMA and UNOCI.2
Scepticism
Utilizing the dataset constructed for this pro-
ject, it is difficult to clearly identify states that 
reject outright UN-mandated stabilization 
missions. However, in 2009 Costa Rica, Cuba 
and Venezuela all expressed strong negative 
comments on MINUSTAH. Cuba equated 
MINUSTAH with a ‘military solution to the 
situation in Haiti’, which it deemed unsuit-
able to address Haiti’s security challenges 
(UN 2009a: 12; UN 2009b: 35). In contrast 
to the support for MINUSTAH expressed by 
the Friends of Haiti, representatives of Costa 
Rica and Venezuela highlighted ‘major mis-
takes’ in prioritising security sector reform 
over social, economic and political develop-
ment (UN 2009b: 18–19). The representative 
of Costa Rica stated: 
[. . .] we have to analyse what we 
are doing now and ask ourselves 
whether we really are moving in the 
right direction and if we are sure that 
within a reasonable time frame, the 
United Nations Stabilization Mission 
in Haiti (MINUSTAH) will be able to 
leave Haiti, leaving behind a strong 
State, a peaceful country and a pros-
perous people (UN 2009b: 18).
The dataset of open UNSC meetings clearly 
reveals Russian support for the stabilization 
of fragile and conflict-affected countries and 
regions around the world, but scepticism 
regarding the inclusion of stabilization ele-
ments in the mandate of a UN peacekeeping 
operation. Russian statements on stabiliza-
tion consistently emphasize that national 
governments should be responsible for the 
stabilization of their own country, with UN 
peacekeeping operations playing a second-
ary and supportive role. For example, when 
discussing MINUSMA in April 2013, the 
Russian representative stressed that:
The primary responsibility for resolving 
the current problems belongs to Malians 
themselves. Every action and task of 
the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA), whose deployment was 
decided on today, must be directed 
exclusively at providing assistance to 
the Malian authorities (UN 2013e: 2).
To some degree, Russian scepticism on stabi-
lization is connected with broader concerns 
regarding the expansion of peacekeeping 
operation mandates to cover protection of 
civilians and the use of force to intervene 
in internal conflicts on the side of govern-
ments (UN 2012: 15–16). For Russia, such 
mandates raise ‘a number of unresolved 
legal, technical, staff and logistical issues 
for the Organization with the potential for 
adverse effects on the missions’ effective-
ness, the image of the United Nations and, 
most importantly, the peacekeepers’ secu-
rity’ (UN 2014a: 25). To a degree, representa-
tives from South Asia have echoed some of 
these concerns in open UNSC meetings (UN 
2014a: 27). For example, in 2012 the Indian 
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representative noted that ‘[t]asks ranging 
from establishing law and order and the rule 
of law to national institution-building can-
not be entrusted to military components 
alone’ (UN 2012: 19).
There are a limited number of statements 
from states located in the Middle East and 
North Africa that can be utilized to discern 
clear positions on stabilization missions. 
There is support for stabilization to ensure 
peace and prosperity, but Arab states have 
addressed questions regarding stabilization 
to the UNSC. In July 2004, Amre Moussa, 
Secretary-General of the League of Arab 
States, asked: 
Is stabilization an objective in itself? 
Is the purpose to cool down conflicts 
that are growing? Sometimes we find 
that, even when a situation is calm 
and when concerns are allayed, dan-
ger will remain if the status quo con-
tinues. The notion that stability will 
lead to peace and reconstruction has 
yet to be confirmed. It is in fact pos-
sible to take the opposite course: first 
to establish peace in order to ensure 
the success of peacekeeping opera-
tions, and then to pursue security, 
reconstruction, reconciliation and 
stability (UN 2004c: 14). 
Given the situation in the region since 2011, 
further examination of attitudes to stabiliza-
tion are warranted, beyond the UNSC dataset 
utilised for this paper.
Conclusion
This article presents preliminary findings 
from a comprehensive content analysis of 
the use of the term stabilization in open 
UNSC meetings between 2001 and 2014. The 
paper sought to address two objectives:
• Provide an account of the use of stabi-
lization in open UNSC meetings at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century; 
and
• Determine the extent to which west-
ern conceptualization(s) of stabiliza-
tion resonated with UN member 
states from other regional groups, or 
if they reinterpreted or rejected such 
conceptualization(s)
With regards to the first objective, the 
research clearly demonstrates a significant 
increase in the frequency of the use of sta-
bilization in open UNSC meetings between 
2001 and 2014, with its appearance in 40 
per cent of open UNSC meetings in 2014 
compared to ten per cent in 2002. This is not 
surprising given the expansion of mandates 
that contain stabilization goals from coun-
tries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo 
and East Timor at the turn of the millennium 
to Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, 
Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Timor-Leste 
by 2013–2014. Proposals for peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding missions led by the UN or 
regional organizations focussing on stabili-
zation and longer-term measures to prevent 
conflict and support political and socio-
economic development have become firmly 
embedded in UNSC discourse. UN agencies 
themselves, in particular the DPKO, have fur-
ther reinforced this tendency.
Yet when it comes to utilizing the dataset 
to determine whether UN member states 
accepted or rejected the P3 conceptualiza-
tions of stabilization, there are significant 
challenges. The lack of a clear conceptual-
ization of stabilization in the P3 provides 
the first challenge. However, this is further 
compounded by the fact that utilizing the 
UNSC meeting dataset alone does not permit 
one to definitively determine whether a state 
supports or rejects or seeks to utilize just 
some elements of the stabilization agenda. 
It is clear that host states welcome elements 
of the stabilization doctrine, along with EU 
and NATO states. GRULAC and sub-Saharan 
African states tend to favour different forms 
of stabilization in their regions. For most of 
the GRULAC states that spoke in the UNSC 
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during the period covered, the experience 
of MINUSTAH in Haiti was regarded as hav-
ing provided a comprehensive approach 
for security and stability. Costa Rica, Cuba 
and Venezuela were the exceptions. They 
questioned whether the ‘military solution’ 
that they perceived MINUSTAH to represent 
could deliver stabilization and socio-eco-
nomic development. Sub-Saharan African 
states generally support more robust peace-
keeping mandates for stabilization missions 
in their region, while the use of force to sup-
port government forces engaged in conflict 
with armed groups is welcomed. Indian and 
Russian scepticism appeared to be connected 
with state sovereignty primacy for resolving 
security challenges, and concerns regarding 
the expansion of the mandates of peacekeep-
ing operations.
There are several groups of states for 
which the dataset constructed for this article 
lacks information. First, it has not been able 
to determine from Chinese interventions a 
definitive position with regards to stabili-
zation missions. However, in 2014, China’s 
representative in the UNSC announced 
that China was providing a security team to 
MINUSMA and its first peacekeeping infan-
try battalion to a UN peacekeeping mission 
in South Sudan (UN 2014c: 19). This would 
appear to signal an important avenue for 
further enquiry beyond this dataset both 
within UN meetings and beyond. Second, 
the voices of some of the most significant 
contributors to UN peacekeeping missions 
only made limited statements on stabiliza-
tion in open UNSC meetings. This is obvi-
ously connected with the nature of UNSC 
membership, but opportunities were 
granted to such states in debates on peace-
keeping operations and related themes. It is 
therefore an avenue to potentially pursue 
further by applying this method to an analy-
sis of General Assembly records, in particu-
lar the Fourth Committee which deals with 
peacekeeping operations.
This article is intended as an initial con-
tribution to the study of national views 
on stabilization, in particular as expressed 
within the UN system. Greater analysis of the 
linkages between regional organizations and 
the UN in this sphere is certainly a poten-
tially rich avenue for exploration. Moreover, 
the paper looks to open avenues to greater 
study of the dynamics of the UNSC. By uti-
lising methods of data extraction of open 
meetings, a significant quantitative contribu-
tion can be made to this discussion. To take 
this form of research further, it can be com-
bined with data gathered from interviews 
with diplomats, policymakers, academics 
and journalists that pay particular attention 
to the UNSC’s role in the framing of multi-
lateral solutions for international peace and 
security challenges. Such a mixed-method 
approach could offer a holistic view of how 
policies such as stabilization are introduced, 
confronted and accommodated.
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Notes
 1 UNSC meeting records tend to use ‘stabi-
lization’ spelling, but there are 28 entries 
in which ‘stabilisation’ is used – in par-
ticular with regards to the International 
Stabilisation Force in Timor Leste. This 
article includes both spellings when dis-
cussing ‘stabilization’.
 2 See for example: Malawi (UN 2014a: 56); 
Mozambique (UN 2013g: 2); Nigeria (UN 
2014a: 15); Rwanda (UN 2013b: 2); and 
Tanzania (UN 2013a: 38).
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